

The Notion of *Eikos* Within Conspiracy Theories. A Rhetorical Analysis.

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Abstract Based on the analysis of one specific conspiracy theory, this paper will explore, from the rhetorical framework, the antic concept of likelihood [*eikos*]. Indeed, we believe that the rhetorical approach could allow us, on a larger scale, to (re)question, in the light of contemporary challenges, the complex relationship we have with the notions of rationality and truth. More precisely, to proceed with the rhetorical analysis, we will mobilise two types of logical reasoning: first, “the logic of the pot” argument from pragmatic logic and second, the logic of amplification and poetization of discourse. This will allow us to draw some comparisons between conspiracist speeches and, respectively, the rhetorical genres of judicial and epideictic discourses. The comparisons will be based on the criteria of likelihood, *eikos*, in order to propose a first definition of this notion in conspiracist discourses

Keywords: Conspiracy theories, logical reasoning, rhetoric, likelihood, *eikos*; judicial, epideictic.

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0. Introduction

This paper aims to question, through an exploration of the concept of likelihood [*eikos*], our relationship to the notion of truth. This exploration will be made from the rhetorical analysis of a conspiracy theory. Indeed, we believe that the rhetorical study of conspiracist discourses could allow us, on a larger scale, to (re)question, in the light of contemporary challenges, the ambiguous and complex relationship we have with the notions of rationality and truth (Danblon 2020).

To contribute to this ambitious project, as we said, we will focus here only on the question of likelihood within conspiracist discourses. By proposing an analysis of the rhetorical proof of the *logos*, we will try to determine the type of likelihood that these discourses mobilise. We will conduct our research by exploring the relationship between conspiracist discourses and, first, a judicial type of *eikos* and, second, an epideictic type of *eikos* (Piazza & Di Piazza 2012). In conclusion, we will outline a possible definition of a “conspiracist *eikos*”.

Our study proposes the analysis of one specific conspiracist discourse: the plea in support of Mehdi Nemmouche, the main suspect in the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014, by the lawyer Sébastien Courtoy. The defence put forward by

Mehdi Nemmouche’s lawyer was that the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels was not the work of his client but rather the result of a plot by Mossad, Iranian and Belgian authorities. According to his line of defence, Mehdi Nemmouche was only a designated guilty party, a scapegoat, in a much more complex power game.

To proceed with the rhetorical analysis of the discursive situation described above, we will mobilise two types of logical reasoning. First, to interrogate the concept of judicial *eikos*, an argument from pragmatic logic: ‘the logic of the pot’ argument (Pernot 2016). Secondly, to question the concept of epideictic *eikos*, an argument from the logic of amplification and poetization of discourse (Dominicy & Frédéric 2001). As we will note in the analysis, the conspiracist *eikos* will borrow jointly from these two types of logical reasonings. We suggest that this use of these two types of reasonings, which are normally distinct, is part of a typically contemporary attitude, characterised by the hybridisation and confusion of discursive genres (Danblon 2020).

1. Rhetorical framework for the analysis

To proceed with the rhetorical analysis of the chosen corpus and to explore the concept of *eikos* (Piazza & Di Piazza 2012), we propose to start from the table presented below. This table contains two types of categories: on the one hand, the three rhetorical proofs, which are transversal to any type of discourse, and on the other hand, elements that are mobilised when considering the discourses according to the rhetorical genre to which they belong. The transversal elements of analysis are *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos*, i.e., the means of persuasion constructed in and by the discourse (*Rhet.*, 1356a 1-3). The elements of analysis specific to the discursive genres are the objective of persuasion aimed at by the speaker and the audience he/she addresses¹. To these first five criteria of analysis, we added the category of likelihood (*eikos*). At the beginning of the study, here is what we can say about judicial, epideictic and conspiracist speeches:

	<i>Ethos</i>	<i>Pathos</i>	<i>Logos</i>	Aim of the speech	Audience	likelihood - <i>eikos</i>
Judicial speech	Expertise	Pity/ indignation	Enthymeme	Prosecution or defence	Judges	Factual and individual <i>eikos</i>
Epideictic speech	Citizen, politician	Pride / shame	Amplification	Praise or blame (<i>homonoiā</i>)	Citizen as spectators	Poetical and generic <i>eikos</i>
Conspiracist speech	A certain parresiast	?	?	Prosecution of defence + a sens of <i>homonoiā</i> ?	?	?

t.1. Presentation of the rhetorical genres before the study

¹ In Aristotle, the arguments (the three proofs) are not evaluated in terms of effectiveness and validity, but they are considered persuasive or not in that they are adapted or not to their audience (*Rhet.*, 1354a, 6-10).

The elements specific to judicial and epideictic discourse are covered by most rhetorical treatises and are taken for granted by most of the studies that follow², except for the category of likelihood which is more questionable and which we will discuss in more detail later (Piazza & Di Piazza 2012). For what would fall under the proper conspiracist discourse, we see that the scene is sparser. Firstly, even though, the question of the aim of the discourse seems to be relatively clear: to establish the facts and to judge them, i.e. to prosecute or defend someone or a group of people (Dominicy 2010), this presentation is a bit more complex. Indeed, a certain desire to make sense should be added, responding to the need to believe and to form a community (see Bronner 2013; Cueille 2020; Klein & Nera 2021). Secondly, the question of *ethos*, as we see, has been studied previously, and for this we refer the reader to previous contributions, which argue that the conspiracist *ethos* is built on a degraded version of the typically democratic right of parrhesia (Danblon & Donckier, forthcoming; Donckier, forthcoming) the right to say what one thinks without fear of reprisal (Serra 2017). And then, thirdly, the present study will enable us to put forward some ideas for “fill in the blanks” for the category of *logos* in regard with the “likelihood – *eikos*” category presented in the above table. The other remaining categories will be explored in further studies.

2. Judicial *eikos* and conspiracist speeches

Firstly, the comparison and confrontation between judicial discourses and conspiracist discourses is the most obvious. Indeed, conspiracist speeches are presented as discourses that claim to re-establish the facts, to judge them and to prosecute or defend certain people (Eggs 1994; Dominicy 2010). If so, they should therefore mobilise a judicial type of likelihood³.

Judicial likelihood is a matter of factuality and particularity. An event is judged in terms of possibility and responsibility, and the reasoning used to construct judicial likelihood is what Aristotle calls enthymeme⁴, logical reasoning that considers the contingency of reality (*Rhet.* I, 1-11 1355a). This conception of likelihood can be embodied in the respect of the principle of non-contradiction, which is both a logical principle (one cannot have both A and -A at the same time) and a pragmatic principle that avoids the negation of facts: an event cannot have taken place and not have taken place, an object cannot both exist and not exist (Vigna 1992: 49). In concrete terms, if a witness contradicts himself, he is considered to be lying and not trustworthy. In fact, any judicial discourse, to be likely, must therefore respect this principle, as Aristotle also states in the following passage:

“Another proper place for refutation is to examine the facts which do not agree, to see whether this discordance comes from the places and times of any actions or from words, considering separately the situation of his opponent; for example: “He says he is your friend, but he has sworn to the Trentures”; – or his own: “He says I like trials, but he cannot show that I have provoked one”; – or finally, that of the opponent and his own: “He has never lent any money, and I have released (from their debts) many of you.” (*Rhet.* II, 1400a 23)

² For a review of the Aristotle’s treatise *Rhetoric*, see in English (Kennedy 2007), in French (Chiron 2007) and in Italian (Piazza 2008).

³ Note that in a further study, it will be necessary to interrogate the almost ironic fact that the very possibility of conspiracy (and thus of conspiracy theory) arises from the notion of *eikos*. Indeed, the conspiracy, which is per definition un-likely, non-*eikos*, is still possible thanks to the very definition of *eikos*. The implausible, non-*eikos* conspiracy is possible.

⁴ The enthymeme is a syllogism whose major premise, which belongs to the order of the probable, of contingency, is most often implicit (*Rhet.* I, 1-11, 1355a)

But other argumentative strategies exist, and this principle of non-contradiction is in essence opposed to “the logic of the pot” (Pernot 2016). Indeed, this argument is a reasoning that not only accepts contradiction but also builds its persuasive force on contradiction⁵. Even though it may sometime produce a persuasive effect, “the logic of the pot” is, *a priori*, not compatible with the principle of non-contradiction and, if it is mobilised in the framework of a judicial reasoning, the discourse should be, *a priori*, considered as un-likely (non *eikos*), and thus, non-persuasive. It should be noted that the way we look at a speech, the (dis)qualification of it and the assessment of its persuasive force, the evaluation of its effectiveness is always considered regarding the audience to which the orator is speaking to (Piazza 2008).

Therefore, as conspiracist speeches claim to establish past facts and to judge them, they should be anchored in a regime of rationality that considers judicial likelihood (Eggs 1994; Dominicy 2010). And this is all the truer in the case that concerns us: the (conspiracist) speaker is a lawyer who defends his client in front of the court. However, as we shall see from the extract analysed below, it is, on the contrary, a reasoning based on “the logic of the pot” that the orator, the lawyer Sébastien Courtoy, uses.

At first:	<i>A has borrowed a copper pot from B and after returning it, B accuses him because the cauldron now has a large hole in it that makes it unusable.</i>
	Mehdi Nemmouche is accused of being the perpetrator of the attack carried out against the Jewish Museum of Brussels.
At second:	<i>I did not borrow a cauldron from B at all,</i>
	Mehdi Nemmouche is not the perpetrator
At third:	<i>The cauldron already had a hole in it when I received it from.</i>
	Mehdi Nemmouche did it but as the victim of a conspiracy.

t.2. Sébastien Courtoy’s plea in support of Mehdi Nemmouche⁶ and the “logic of the pot”

The presence of a reasoning based on the “logic of the pot”, allowing us to establish the non-respect of the principle of non-contradiction, should produce, as Aristotle maintains, an effect of evidence such that the discourse would be automatically disqualified (Danblon 2009). In this case, this discursive evidence effect (evidence effect produced technically by the discourse) is combined with an extra-technical evidence effect⁷. Indeed, video recordings and traces of DNA found at the crime scene also attest

⁵ For a detailed presentation of “the logic of the pot” see (Pernot 2016).

⁶ For a detailed and chronological presentation of the events, see the Belgian information channel BX1: <https://bx1.be/dossiers-archives/attentat-du-musee-juif/attentat-du-musee-juif-nemmouche-et-bendrer-declares-coupables-retour-sur-les-moments-marquants-du-proces/>.

⁷ Aristotle classifies the means of persuasion available to the speaker into two main categories: technical means and extra-technical means. While the technical means (*ethos*, *pathos*, *logos*) are constructed by and in

to Mehdi Nemmouche's guilt. The principle of non-contradiction is therefore violated twice: from the point of view of the logical reasoning presented by the speaker and from a factual point of view in relation to the extra-technical evidence available to the court in this context. In fact, the audience to which Sébastien Courtoy was first addressing, that of the jurors and judges, found his speech unconvincing and implausible, non-*eikos*, and Mehdi Nemmouche was found guilty.

However, although he was found guilty by the court, the conspiracy theory put forward by Sébastien Courtoy continued to circulate and to be considered likely by a whole series of people⁸. We are thus confronted with a paradox: for a certain part of the public sphere, the claim to re-establish the facts does not suffer from the non-compliance with the principle of non-contradiction. To try to resolve this paradox, we suggest that we need to return to what we said at the beginning of the analysis: some discourses accept contradiction and do not appear any less likely (*eikos*) in the eyes of the audience they address (Pernot 2016; Cueille 2020)

3. Epideictic *eikos* and conspiracist speeches

If Sébastien Courtoy's conspiracy theory seems likely, plausible, to an audience of citizens like you and me – note that we are leaving the strictly judicial framework here – it is perhaps because it borrows from the concept of the epideictic *eikos*. Conspiracist speeches, as we shall see below, present reasonings that, as we have seen, accept contradiction, but also speeches that are built around certain typical discursive mechanisms such as the use of figures, ambiguity, irony⁹. We hypothesize, as we will detail below, that this use of language is close from the processes of amplification; amplification being considered as the typical mark of *logos* in epideictic discourses¹⁰ (*Rhet.*, I, cap. 9). More precisely, epideictic speeches, with the help of poetic amplification mechanisms, seek to produce discourses that make sense to a given community at a certain time. The time of the discourse, the criterion of likelihood is that of the fictional “*as if*”. We pretend, we make *as if* the person we praise is the best person ever, the hero we all wish we were, and we accept this fictional “*as if*” to build a sense of concord (*homonoia*) within the concerned community (Danblon 2001). Epideictic likelihood is thus closer to a poetic conception of discourse, a poetic likelihood that can, in the context of an epideictic discourse, serve persuasion¹¹.

the discourse, the extra-technical means (evidence) are the elements of persuasion which exist outside the discourse and which, *a priori*, are not the object of an argument (*Rhet.*, 1356a 1-3).

⁸ This conspiracy theory is for example presented on the website of Thierry Meyssan, *réseau voltaire*: <https://www.voltairenet.org/article184111.html>. See also the website *conspiracywatch* which presented, in June 2014, a brief overview of the different conspiracy theories surrounding that specific case: https://www.conspiracywatch.info/tuerie-de-bruxelles-ils-orient-au-complot_a1243.html.

⁹ For example, the conspiracist figure of Jean-Jacques Crèvecoeur uses a lot of irony and ambiguous sentences in his videos. More precisely, in the video *CDL44- La théorie du complot enfin révélée (épisode IV)* he speaks about WWII and the Shoah, in relation to the notion of testimony, in a very ambiguous way. In French, he says : «Donc en fait, ce qu'il fallait faire et ça c'est superbement bien fait c'est nous raconter des histoires justement des histoires qui sont totalement fausses par rapport à la réalité de ce qui s'est passé mais comme le temps avance on a de moins en moins de témoins directs. C'est comme ce qu'il s'est passé au moment de la guerre 40-45 il n'y a pratiquement plus personne qui vit aujourd'hui qui ait connu la guerre 40-45 a un âge où il était déjà adulte (...)» (<https://fulllifechannel.com/video/14/cdl44---la-theorie-du-complot-enfin-revelee-episode-iv---conversation-du-lundi-44?channelName=JeanJacquesCrevecoeur>).

¹⁰ For a detailed study on epideictic speeches, see (Dominicy & Frédéric 2001).

¹¹ It is the same idea that Aristotle expresses when he said that «one should prefer the likely impossible [l'impossible vraisemblable/ l'impossible verosimile] to the non-persuasive possible [le possible non persuasif/ il possibile non persuasivo]» (*Poet.*, 9, 145a 36-38).

To try to answer the above paradox, we will analyse another abstract of a speech given by Sébastien Courtoy during Mehdi Nemmouche's trial. This is part of a speech given by the lawyer, outside the courtroom, to the journalists and then rebroadcast on television and internet¹², to an audience made of citizens like you and me, potentially convinced by the conspiracy theory.

<p>«Je crois que ça fait quatre heures que je plaide. Je ne sais pas. Quelque chose comme ça. Le temps passe vite quand on s'amuse. On est en train d'aligner tout le monde (1). Leur histoire [inaudible] de soi-disant attentat islamique qui était soi-disant dû qu'on voulait attaquer Bruxelles pour la punir, la Belgique, pour faire partie de la coalition internationale... J'ai prouvé que cette coalition n'a existé que trois mois plus tard et la Belgique n'en a fait partie que six mois plus tard. Et toutes les thèses (2) sur la non-revendication par l'État Islamique, on les a fait exploser les unes après les autres (3). C'est très sincèrement une boucherie (4) pour les parties civiles, en tout cas pour leurs avocats [...].»</p>	<p>«I think I've been advocating for four hours. I don't know. Something like that. Time flies when you're having fun. We're lining up everybody (1). Their story [inaudible] of the so-called Islamic attack which was supposedly because they wanted to attack Brussels to punish it, Belgium, to be part of the international coalition... I proved that this coalition only existed three months later, and Belgium was only part of it six months later. And all the theories (2) about the Islamic State not claiming responsibility were exploded one after the other (3). It is very sincerely a butchery (4) for the civil parties, at least for their lawyers [...].»</p>
<p>–Vous dites que l'attaque a été vraisemblablement commise par un deuxième homme?</p>	<p>–Are you saying that the attack was probably committed by a second man?</p>
<p>«Ça je vais expliquer dans la plaidoirie tout à l'heure. Pardon. Ils sont bien plus que deux (5) vous savez (6). Mais ça je vais expliquer. On les voit partout d'ailleurs. Il y a les armes qui désactivent, les guetteurs...machin, les gars en bagnole, Nemmouche qui arrive de l'autre côté avec son sac de couchage. C'est une histoire de merde (7). On le sait bien tous (8). Et d'ailleurs, les parties civiles, ils</p>	<p>«I'll explain that in the closing arguments later. I'm sorry. They are way more than two (5), you know (6). But I'll explain that. You see them everywhere. There are the weapons that deactivate, the watchmen... what's-his-name, the guys in the car, Nemmouche who arrives on the other side with his sleeping bag. It's a shitty story (7). We all know that (8). And besides, the civil parties are not laughing now (9). And that's it. But we'll</p>

¹² See Sébastien Courtoy's interview on the Belgian information channel BX1: <https://youtu.be/3bkGEIxu4rs>.

<p>rigolent pas pour le moment (9). Voilà. Mais ça on va expliquer. Alors attention, on va expliquer certaines choses mais on veut rester en vie aussi. Je vous le dis».</p>	<p>explain that. So be careful, we're going to explain certain things, but we want to stay alive too. I'm telling you».</p>
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t.3. Sébastien Courtoy's presentation of Mehdi Nemmouche's case outside the court

In this discourse, we have isolated and indicated in bold various discursive expressions that could be related to amplification mechanisms. We have grouped what we will call, so far, figures of amplification, into four categories.

- 1) The expressions «[the thesis] were exploded one after the other» (3) and «it's a butchery» (4) can be compared to metaphors (even if they are of a bad taste in the context of a trial concerning a terrorist attack): they allude to the supposed violence and absolute effectiveness of Sébastien Courtoy's plea. These metaphorical expressions can also be compared to the figure of hyperbole – and thus a certain form of exaggeration – found in the following expressions: «We're lining up everybody» (1), «**all** the theories» (2) and «[the civil parties] are not laughing at the moment» (9) which imply that the outcome of the trial has already been decided, that Sébastien Courtoy's plea was such that the jurors and judges will have no choice but to judge Mehdi Nemmouche innocent.
- 2) Still in the same logic of exaggeration, «they are way more than two» (5) is an expression peculiar to the conspiracy *topos* that underlines the idea that the alleged conspirators are omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent¹³.
- 3) Furthermore, we also find a certain linguistic ambiguity in the use of the term «a shitty story» (7) that Sébastien Courtoy puts forward. At first sight, we tend to consider that it is the official story, the argument of the civil parties, which is «a shitty story» because, according to him, it is unbelievable. But one could also understand this expression as a claim that it is the history in absolute terms that is «shitty»: we would be in a «shitty world» because in any case, we can do nothing against the alleged conspirators who are, as we said, omnipotent and omnipresent.
- 4) Finally, expressions such as «you know» (6) and «we all know» (8) are, in our opinion, part of an “*as if*” effect: the speaker acts *as if* the whole audience shares his opinion according to which we are facing a conspiracy. Sébastien Courtoy acts *as if* the audience shares his point of view and by doing so, he also creates a certain connivance with the audience, we are supposedly trustworthy and wise enough¹⁴ to have understood what was really going on.

It seems to us, therefore, that we are faced with a discourse that makes use of different mechanisms of amplification; only, we do not think that we are confronted with an effect of amplification that is strictly speaking epideictic. In fact, it does not seem possible to us to consider that the likelihood constructed by conspiracist discourses is equivalent to an epideictic likelihood (generic and poetic), for two reasons.

¹³ The idea of conceiving the alleged conspirators as divine figures is also taken up and developed by Clémentine Hougue (Hougue 2021).

¹⁴ Note that in a further study, it will be necessary to interrogate the topical construction and the almost doxastic component of the *enlightened*, the *awaked one* that we find in conspiracist speeches.

Firstly, this use of certain amplification mechanisms denies one of the fundamental features of epideictic discourse, a discursive feature that we have not yet presented as such in this study: in epideictic discourse, amplification is assumed as a poetic figure, built on an ethical-aesthetic premise (Danblon 2001). In the discourse we are studying, this ethical-aesthetic presupposition is not respected, and this leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: we would be facing amplification without poetization, a particular kind of amplification that we suggest to name “exaggeration”. Although these “mechanisms of exaggeration” would allow us to link conspiracist speeches to the “*as if*” logic of epideictic speeches, they would not allow the speaker to construct an epideictic likelihood. Indeed, these discursive mechanisms allow the construction of a generic but not poetic *eikos*. Second, despite the construction of a certain generic likelihood, produced discursively through exaggeration, conspiracist discourses cannot be thought of in isolation. Conspiracist discourses, even if they can be considered as responding to a need to make sense (Bronner 2013, Cueille 2020, Klein & Nera 2021), also claim to re-establish the facts, and are thus *de facto* denying the fictional character of the epideictic genre contained in the discursive “*as if*”. From this, arises an effect of cognitive dissonance that could almost be described as spectacular, between the lexical exaggeration produced and the facts concerned. This discrepancy can be observed in a typical way when, for example, Sébastien Courtoy describes his plea as a «butchery for the opposing parties» (4): the use of such an expression would mean that the case would already be judged and that the outcome of the judgement (according to him, his client's innocence) would already be known to everyone, whereas it is exactly the opposite that is happening inside the court. This cognitive gap between lexical exaggeration (of the generic order) and the reality of the facts (of the factual/particular order), although spectacular, is still incomprehensible in rhetorical terms at this stage.

4. Conclusion: A conspiracist *eikos*?

Therefore, we are confronted with a discourse that mobilises different aspects of likelihood and that produces a spectacular, incomprehensible, effect. In that it is so bizarre, we take from Aristotle (Danblon 2009) the idea that it is difficult to give it a name, to identify it clearly, at least at this stage of the work. Nevertheless, we can, even without knowing how to name it, notice that it is a type of discourse that functions with an *eikos*, a likelihood that we could call hybrid. This specific kind of likelihood would borrow at the same time, from judicial likelihood the will to establish the facts and judge them (characteristic of factuality) and from epideictic likelihood the use of certain mechanisms of amplification – which we have called exaggeration.

	<i>Ethos</i>	<i>Pathos</i>	<i>Logos</i>	Aim of the speech	Audience	likelihood- <i>eikos</i>
Judicial speech	Expertise	Pity/ indignation	Enthymeme	Prosecution or defence	Judges	Factual and individual <i>eikos</i>
Epideictic speech	Citizen, politician	Pride / shame	Amplification	Praise or blame (<i>homonoia</i>)	Citizen as spectators	Poetical and generic <i>eikos</i>
Conspiracist speech	A certain parresias	?	exaggeration	Prosecution of defence + a sens of <i>homonoia</i> ?	?	Hybrid <i>eikos</i> (factual and generic)

t.4. Presentation of the rhetorical genres after the study

This *eikos*, which is both factual and generic, could be compared with the conspiracists' attempt to relate to the notion of truth. As we suggested in a previous paper, and this will have to be the subject of further study, conspiracist discourses borrow from both the archaic and the modern truth regime (Danblon & Donckier, forthcoming). In a simplified and schematic version for the purpose, the archaic truth regime would be more of a generic type: truth is ambiguous, and it appears normal to "believe in stories" (Vernant 1974). In contrast, the regime of truth in the modern period is more that of logical reasoning, synonymous with objectivity, observation of reality (empirism) and factuality (Detienne 1967)¹⁵.

From the point of view of the hypothesis of the hybrid, at the level of the relationship that conspiracy theories would have with the notion of truth on the one hand, and with the concept of likelihood, of *eikos*, on the other, we believe that it is possible to consider a strategy of hierarchisation and qualification of discourses to confront the conspiracist phenomenon. Indeed, conspiracist speeches, as we study them in rhetoric, appear to be hybrid speeches that would seem to be the paroxysm of our rhetorical incompetence to distinguish one type of speech from another. Conspiracist discourses blur the boundaries of the judicial and the epideictic genres in such a way that, for example, we no longer recognise amplification for what it is, i.e. a process of fictionalisation and poetization of the world. In the same way, these discourses also complicate our relationship with the facts. Whereas before, when faced with information that was obviously false, two attitudes were possible, the first was the outright lie, the second was the epideictic hypothesis (Danblon 2004: 52-54), today's conspiracist discourses represent neither of these attitudes. Conspiracy theories involve a different relationship to facts, a relationship to facts that is undoubtedly marked by the regime of post-truth (Danblon 2020).

Nevertheless, to address the spread and multiplication of conspiratorial discourse today, we would perhaps need to prioritise and qualify the various discourses for what they are (Danblon 2004). In this way, we would regain our ability to distinguish between judicial discourse and epideictic discourse, as well as between political discourse, propaganda discourse and scientific discourse, and therefore, we would maybe, be in a better position to distinguish between the different regimes of truth that surround us: judicial truth, scientific truth, and rhetorical likelihood, the *eikos*.

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¹⁵ We draw the reader's attention to the fact that, on the one hand, we make no value judgement on these two rationality regimes. And on the other hand, we also point out that both rationality regimes consider the empirical reality of facts.

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