Abductive Theory of Cognition. The Eco-Cognitive Model

Abstract

Abduction is a procedure in which something that lacks classical explanatory epistemic virtue can be accepted because it possesses a virtue of another type: Gabbay and Woods contend (GW- Model) that abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character (GABBAY – WOODS 2005). From this point of view abductive reasoning is a response to an ignorance-problem. Abductive reasoning is an ignorance-preserving accommodation of the problem at hand. Is abduction really ignorance- preserving? To better answer this question I will describe my eco-cognitive model (EC-model) of abduction some examples taken from the areas of both philosophy and epistemology. It will be demonstrated that through abduction, knowledge can be enhanced, even when abduction is not considered an inference to the best explanation in the classical sense of the expression, that is an inference inevitably characterized by an empirical evaluation stage, or an inductive stage, as Peirce called it. Peirce provides various justifications of the knowledge-enhancing role of abduction, even when abduction is not conceived an inference to the best explanation, that is an inference inevitably characterized by an empirical evaluation phase, as I just said. These justifications basically resort to the conceptual use of evolutionary and metaphysical ideas, which resort to indicate that abduction is constitutively akin to truth, even if certainly always ignorance-preserving or mitigating in the sense that the “absolute truth” is never reached through abduction. Finally, other two examples of knowledge-enhancing abduction will be indicated: abducing conventions and abducing scientific models