

Scaffolded Cognition, Basic Mentality and Language: Some non-representationalist insights from the later Wittgenstein

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Abstract Building on insights from the later Wittgenstein, this paper thematizes the non-representational basis of human language games. It considers how linguistic activity is enacted as a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be adequately described solely by means of the central enactivist concepts of ‘sense-making’, ‘participatory sensemaking’ and ‘basic minds’. Rather, the argument goes, the human capacity for partaking in linguistic activity is bound to the faculty of understanding as well as doxastic and proto-doxastic attitudes that can be both explicit and implicit in linguistic utterances. The paper shows how such beliefs play a crucial role in allowing linguistically mediated cognition to scaffold social co-engagements. Further, they attest to the success of language-games by conditioning the satisfactory outcome of such games thus allowing not only their unhindered ongoing but also their reoccurrence.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Language-games, Doxa, Enactivism, Non-representational Cognition

Received 7 February 2019; accepted 22 April 2019.

0. Introduction

Cognition is found in all living things (Thompson 2007). Basic cognitive activity predates language in terms of its place in the history of both the evolution (cf. Kolodny, Edelman 2018) and human material culture. Linguistic phenomena originate «from the interactions of several brains in social networks» (Donald 2017: 205) and build on *material signification* that neither presuppose symbols nor mental representations (cf. Malafouris 2013). In radical cognitive science, enactivists have so far paid only little attention to the phenomenon of language despite having an interest in cognitive phenomena ranging from the level of cells and bacteria to human societies. And in the less-than-a-handful of cases where they actually do so (i.e. Hutto, Myin 2013, Cuffari 2014, Cuffari *et al.* 2015), they end up considering language in ways that are at odds with enactivism’s non-representationalist basis¹. The purpose of this paper is to inform

¹ My focus centers on enactivist accounts that explicitly seek to link so-called basic mentality with linguistic cognition. This focus is motivated by the fact that enactivists who abstain from considering basic mentality (e.g. Bottineau 2012, Jensen, Cuffari 2014) use mentalist concepts when clarifying linguistic activity. For instance, in his account on writing systems, Bottineau points out that these systems

enactivist debates by exploring the non-representational basis of linguistic activity while drawing on insights from Wittgenstein's writings. Before turning to my positive claim, I first substantiate the critical point: that standard enactivist accounts on basic mentality are insufficient for exploring non-representational aspects of language.

1. The limits of REC-style basic mentality

With their *Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content* Hutto and Myin propose a radical enactivism – or REC. REC's radicality stems from its central concept of *basic minds* which designates the most basic kind of cognition found in all living beings. On a REC-view, other enactivist positions (i.e. *Sensory-Motor Enactivism* and *Autopoietic Enactivism*) are less radical because of their inclination to describe cognitive phenomena in mentalist terms. Hutto and Myin thus present REC as the most consistent (and radical) enactivist take on cognition. Yet, as Harvey (2015) notes, REC's anti-representationalism does not extend to include language and linguistic-based cognition. So, even if their account on basic minds is persuasive, it nevertheless fails to account for concept-infused cognition which, as McDowell (2009) observes, is a cornerstone in human cognition. Indeed, as hinted at by Froese and Di Paolo (2011), some 'elaborate' cognitive phenomena are taken to entail a scaffolding of mental phenomena whereby conceptual knowledge allows language-users to orient themselves beyond lived immediacy and towards global structures which involves, amongst other things, attaching concepts to things (Latour 1996, Gahrn-Andersen 2019). Proponents of REC have already sought to repudiate this criticism by claiming that REC does not exclude the possibility that linguistic activity can be seen as devoid of representations (see, Myin, Hutto 2014, Hutto, Satne 2015). Yet, a problem remains in that they abstain from showing how basic mentality figures in language. Consequently, REC involves a tension between, on the one hand, basic minds that have the basic cognitive capacities of all biological individuals and, on the other, linguistic-based cognition which Hutto and Myin (2013) explicitly associate with conceptual content and, thus, mental representations. Accordingly, one encounters passages such as this: «Some cognitive activity – plausibly, that associated with and depend upon the mastery of language – surely involves content» (Hutto, Myin 2013: xviii).

2. A critical look at 'sense-making'

I now turn to one of the enactivist positions that REC criticizes: Autopoietic Enactivism (AE) (e.g. Di Paolo 2005, Thompson 2007, Froese, Di Paolo 2011, Cuffari *et al.* 2015) which currently is the strongest current in enactivist research. The purpose in so doing is to show that the central concept of 'sense-making' is inadequate for describing basic cognition in language.

«correlate varying aspects of recorded experience with the act of reading: letter and syllabic systems associate the visual bottom-up input with a vocal prediction of the acoustic counterpart, as in the reformed syllabic alphabet of present-day Korean, a vocal and cultural writing that causes the reader to enact human vocal output in the first place, and, from there, the semantic counterpart in general experience; ideogram systems (Chinese keys and first-generation Egyptian hieroglyphics) associate the optical unit with the experience of the 'object' and not that of any human vocal output: the writing system is targeted at the non-vocal part of physical experience» (Bottineau 2012: 273-274). The absence of critical reflection on basic mentality vis-a-vis language clearly evades anti-representationalism as Bottineau tend to describe writing in mentalist terms (e.g. 'recorded experience', 'semantic', 'associate', 'non-vocal part of physical experience').

Building on works by Varela and colleagues (1991), proponents of AE have made the theoretical notion of *sense-making* central to their work. Sense-making, they claim, designate the cognition in humans, animals and other biological systems in general. On their definition, all living systems make sense of their surroundings in the sense that sense-making becomes «an intrinsic perspective of value on the world» (cf. Di Paolo 2005: 434). It is by means of sense-making that a system relates to its environment in manners that correspond to either an intrinsic interest or value.

As a theoretical concepts, sense-making comes with a well-known shortcoming. As pointed out elsewhere, what accounts for bacteria and ants cannot encompass human social phenomena including language (cf. Cowley, Gahrn-Andersen 2015). This issue arises in that AE pursues paradigmatic aspirations² which entail an affinity towards so-called ‘strong life-mind continuity’ (cf. Godfrey-Smith 1996). Those in favor of AE not only presume that cognition is present throughout the evolution but also that we can account for its occurrences across populations and species by using the same theoretical concepts. Indeed, as Clark writes, the thesis of strong life-mind continuity would be true if «the basic concepts needed to understand the organization of life turned out to be [...] central to a proper scientific understanding of mind» (Quote by Andy Clark in Thompson 2007: 128-129). AE’s commitment to strong continuity entails that the concept of sense-making is to be used when exploring different kinds of cognitive phenomena. Interestingly, proponents of AE recognize that sense-making cannot suffice to account for human-style sociality. One reason for this is that sense-making in itself is not social but bio-cognitive:

Sense-making is an inherently active concept. Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations whose significant value is to be added later. Natural cognitive systems are simply not in the business of accessing their world in order to build accurate pictures of it. They actively participate in the generation of meaning in what matters to them; they enact a world. Sense-making is a relational and affect-laden process grounded in biological organization (De Jaegher, Di Paolo 2007: 488).

Given AE’s commitment to strong life-mind continuity, sense-making necessarily has to form the basis of any elaborate cognitive phenomenon including that of basic embodied coordination between a minimum of two sense-making agents. Consequently, this motivates De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) to introduce *participatory sense-making* as a social (in the rudimental sense of the word) equivalent of sense-making and, further, Cuffari *et al.* (2015) to develop an account on language based on the concept of participatory sense-making (and sprinkled with a fair share of speculative dialectics).

Having clarified why the notion of sense-making has no direct bearing on human linguistic activity, I now consider why it would be problematic to presume that basic mentality in language emerges from this bio-cognitive attitude. In this connection, we need to take a closer look at the critical issue raised by Cowley and Gahrn-Andersen (2015) and Gahrn-Andersen and Cowley (2017). Sense-making can be criticized for being grounded in the assumption that cognizers are strongly autonomous. For examples, when applied to humans, the concept fails to account for how people take on social values. For theoretical reasons, proponents of AE posit that agents are

² These paradigmatic aspirations are readily evident from statements such as: AE is «a paradigm which radicalizes the embodied-embedded approach by placing autonomous agency and lived subjectivity at the heart of cognitive science» (Froese 2007: 64).

autonomous and operationally closed. Given such operational closure, there can be no way of identifying or relating to unknown aspects of the environment. And since ‘strong life-mind continuity’ is considered as a prerequisite, there seems to be no way for a view based in the theoretical concept of sense-making to consistently account for human social phenomena and language.

3. Wittgenstein and the ‘axis of linguistic activity’

Having argued that proponents of enactivism leave aside the foundational non-representational nature of linguistic activity, I now turn to my positive argument. I offer such a clarification based on some of Wittgenstein’s insights by endorsing what Rorty calls *a pragmatist take* on Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Rorty explains: «Pragmatic Wittgensteinians do not want to recapture Wittgenstein’s own way of thinking, but rather to restate his best arguments in more effective ways» (2007: 165). What follows is thus to be read as something other than an attempt to outline how Wittgenstein saw language. Rather, my interest lies in exploring how certain elements of his thinking can inform the non-representationalist agenda of contemporary cognitive science. My focus therefore includes what might otherwise be seen as peripheral aspects of his philosophy. It makes sense to adopt a pragmatist approach because, as Okrent (2005) points out, anti-representationalism is foundational to pragmatism. However, I depart from this approach in one decisive respect: by acknowledging the crucial importance of Wittgenstein’s ‘linguistic turn’ (cf. Rorty 2007: 166). Accordingly, I develop my argument based on, not the *Tractatus*, but *Philosophical Investigations* and, especially, *On Certainty*.

In terms of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, one could easily be led into a procedure that focuses on the different *language-games* (or forms of life) that are entailed by language-in-use (Wittgenstein 1953). A focus on these games could thus be seen as a natural consequence of Wittgenstein’s critique of how philosophers of language have pursued ‘language’ as consisting in pre-established linguistic rules and meanings. Indeed, rather than positing pre-defined and timeless linguistic elements, Wittgenstein explores the applied dimension of wordings and sentences. Accordingly, he shows no interest in ‘linguistics’ proper. Consequently, linguistic meanings ought not to be considered as pre-determined. Rather, the «meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what we learn when the word is incorporated into our language» (Wittgenstein 1969: §61, 10e). Wittgenstein thus pushes the idea that linguistic meanings pertain to linguistic activity (cf. Coliva 2010: 156). On this pragmatist view, meanings require, not mental representations in the head of the language-user, but situated practical knowledge that allows us to play language-games and, inseparably, for such games to shape our knowledge, practice and imaginations. Like contemporary anti-representationalists, Wittgenstein therefore takes cognitive and linguistic action to form part of our social embedding in the world. Being reducible to ongoing behavior, there is nothing permanent to language (considered as an isolated phenomenon). Indeed, as Wittgenstein writes, «a language-game does change over time» (Wittgenstein 1969: §256, 34e). Yet, I focus on, not the games themselves, but their more stable elements that ground human linguistic activity and, thus, cut across the different language-games that continue to unfold through human practical activities. Doing so seems required in order to say something pervasive about how the non-representational dimension of language can give rise to some kind of linguistic stability. Metaphorically speaking, I consider

Wittgenstein's ontology of language as an old-fashion spinning top³ consisting of two basic elements:

- 1) the continuous rotation of language-games; and
- 2) the axis on which these games 'spin'.

My focus is on the axis that allows linguistic activity to transcend the particularity and relativity of the various language-games that constitute human everyday co-existence. Thus, while a game such as that of Wittgenstein's (1953) builders is contingent, what matters is how rules and games alike can draw on deeper kinds of non-representational resources in individual language-users. As I argue below, this can only be explored if one avoids the temptation to posit a reductionist account and, instead, recognizes the heterogeneous basis of language which, amongst other things, is cognitive. In other words, I explore language, not by promoting a single, super-concept such as 'sense-making' but rather by approaching as a multi-faceted phenomenon that require a set of interchangeable notions. Such interconnected notions are central to the *Investigations*. However, having established the heterogeneity of language, one comes to *On Certainty* which successfully conveys the message that linguistic activity has a doxastic foundation and, consequently, that we should pay more close attention to the cognition of language-users.

4. Cognitive scaffolding

On Certainty explores the centrality of beliefs to languaging. Our beliefs in worldly phenomena are constituted, Wittgenstein shows, on the basis of a history of social interactions and individual experiences that have come to reveal to us certain facts concerning the nature of the world (cf. Wittgenstein 1969: §159, 23e). It is by means of this kind of revealing that we come to form a *world picture* that is bound up with certain beliefs in the ways of the world including how we can talk about it. Experiences never occur in isolation, meaning that they do not teach us just one particular thing but rather implicate «a host of interdependent propositions» (*ivi*: §274, 35e). As Coliva (2010: 183-184) points out, our world picture is so basic that it supersedes otherwise foundational dichotomies such as true-false, rational-irrational *etcetera*.

Our beliefs not only enable us to partake in language; they are also shaped by our linguistic action. This is exemplified in how expressions of doubt might impair the learning of – and, thus, the participation in – language-games. For example, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a child who literally expresses doubt about everything he is told. Consequently, the child becomes «incapable of learning certain language-games» (*ivi*: §283, 37e). Further, a pupil's continuous expressions of doubt might eventually lead his teacher to say something like: «Stop interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don't make sense at all» (*ivi*: §310, 40e). The teacher's felt need for engaging in acts of meta-communication seems motivated by the pupil refusal of central aspects of the teacher's world picture thus inhibiting the teacher from playing specific language-games (i.e. teaching, explaining). Evidently, the described situation is more than unusual; nevertheless, however, we can imagine it. In fact, Heidegger (2010) shows that most of our everyday conversations are so basic, straightforward and routine-based that they do not put anything at stake. Some beliefs are more basic than others. The most basic ones pertain to our proto-doxastic attitudes which are so

³ I am grateful to Stephen Cowley who suggested using this metaphor as a way of considering Wittgenstein's ontology of language. However, I am solely responsible for the account that follows.

foundational and self-evident that we rarely – if ever! – question them (e.g. “the earth exists”; “every human being has parents” *etcetera*).

Foundational beliefs such as these are essential to the language-games we play in that they enable us to make sense of everyday utterances such as “There is a house behind that hill” or “His mother invited us for dinner”. Linguistic activity thus entails a «scaffolding of our thoughts» (Wittgenstein 1969: §211, 29e), meaning that one’s thoughts are extended by activity based on a myriad of implicit beliefs. But rather than having a whole set of beliefs (and propositions) represented in advance, it seems that we draw on an implicit understanding of the ways of the world as we contribute to these games. Beliefs and convictions not only permit us to partake in linguistic activity but also to evolve as skilled language-users and “knowers” without relying on representations or mental models (cf. Blair 2006). The scaffolding of our beliefs enables us to partake in conversations, play various language-games and even infer denotative relations between concepts and things (e.g. that the word *horse* denotes a particular kind of animal).

Wittgenstein emphasizes that while our linguistic acts are usually accompanied by a feeling of certainty (Wittgenstein 1969: §174, 25e) neither convictions nor beliefs are immune to doubts. Indeed, as he emphasizes, from something’s «seeming to me – or to everyone – to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so» (*ivi*: §2, 2e). Over time, we construct beliefs that, at any moment, are potentially at stake in the sense that they might be challenged either by our lived experience or the persuasion of others (cf. *ivi*: §262, 34e). We understand how the world is or what we “think” is the case. This once again underlines that our faculty of understanding is linked with our world picture (cf. *ivi*: §167, 24e) that shapes – and gets shaped by – our engagements with the world. Needless to say, this not only goes for our beliefs in various state of affairs but also, even more fundamentally, our beliefs in language games, their rules and their basic constituents (i.e. wordings).

5. Understanding: the evocation of as-structure

It is by means of proto-doxastic and doxastic attitudes⁴ that our cognition scaffolds as we actively partake in language-games. Yet, such activities are always accompanied by our faculty of understanding which permits us to experience, not the world as it really is, but simply: something as something⁵. The faculty of understanding simply bootstraps our linguistic competencies in that it permits us to conceptually delineate events, things, persons *etcetera* (e.g. “A is B”, “This is a slab”, “His name is James”). This connects with Heidegger who points out that every practice-based interaction involves a capacity for understanding a uniquely manifested thing as a thing of a particular kind or, simply: the evocation of an *as-structure*. Heidegger explains:

[W]e immediately recognize that the ‘as’ signifies a ‘relation’ and that the ‘as’ is never given independently on its own. It points to *something* which stands in the ‘as’, and equally it points to *some other thing, as which* it is [...] [T]his *structural linking* [Gefüge]

⁴ This distinction was first proposed by Husserl (1973). Given Husserl’s implicit commitments to representationalism, I here employ the terms in a way that is liberated from Husserlian terminology.

⁵ Understanding something as something is not only characteristic of language-users. It is found in early hominin evolution and is reflected in tool-use and tool-making thus tying with two crucial prelinguistic traits of human evolution namely «a general, supra-modal capacity to rehearse and refine skills» and material culture (Donald 2017: 204). This is underlined by Acheulean technology which consisted of different types of tools including hand axes, knives and cleavers that were all designed for different purposes (Ambrose 2001).

pertaining to the relation and to the relational terms is not something free-floating on its own account (Heidegger 1927, eng. transl.: 288).

The immediacy of our recognitions emphasize that the experiential as-structure is typically evoked pre-reflectively⁶. This connects well with Wittgenstein's point that linguistic utterances can be compared with «directly taking hold of something» (Wittgenstein 1969: §511, 67e). The importance of this structural linking is underlined by how linguistic denotation allows us to, on a global scale, recognize qualitatively different things (including slabs, cars, tomatoes) as being similar. As I argue elsewhere, the denotative dimension of language separates human meaning-making from the sense-making of, say, baboons in that it allows us to build communities that are not strictly confined to a particular physical location (Gahrn-Andersen 2019). Wittgenstein shows that the evocation of as-structures is intrinsic to linguistic activity. Take, for instance, the following example: «My life shews that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and so on. – I tell a friend e.g. “Take that chair over there”, “Shut the door”, *etc. etc.*» (Wittgenstein 1969: §7, 2e). In order to play this language-game accordingly, one must instigate the structure of perceiving-as that relies on the certainty that the thing pointed at is, in fact, recognized as a chair or door. Noë (2006) shows that perceiving-as entails that we implicitly denote the thing in front of us as an object of a particular type (e.g. a door, a tomato). Thus, it merely involves proto-doxa. Our capacity for having such implicit certainties can, amongst other things, be traced back to the ostensive language teaching which, as Wittgenstein (2009) rightly notes, play an important role in our capacity for playing those language-games that either enact or simply rely on acts of naming and pointing out.

6. Doxastic attitudes and their satisfaction

Having shown that linguistic activity relies on an scaffolding of our beliefs, I now explore not only the basis of this scaffolding but also the phenomenon of *satisfaction* which is important in that it functions as a basic success criterion in the language-games we play. Indeed, this relates to, amongst other things, the fact that these games can be played well or not at all. Satisfaction is crucial in that these games (just like any other game) are intrinsically related to social practices and, thus, have social relations or agential co-engagements as their essence. Indeed, even Heidegger's (1927) notion of *idle talk*, which refers to linguistic activity that fails to reveal anything new (or intellectually interesting), serves a particular socio-practical function: it allows us to pass time while we socialize with others in our mundane everyday-life.

As noted above, Wittgenstein diverges from orthodox philosophy of language⁷ in that he traces our linguistic abilities to, not represented knowledge, but enacted beliefs. Whether such beliefs are sufficient for grounding linguistic activity depends on the satisfaction they afford in the sense that if «e.g. someone says “I don't know if there's a hand here” he might be told “Look closer” – This possibility of satisfying oneself is part

⁶ Whereas animals are able to prereflectively cognize indexical sign-object relations (see Deacon 1998) that rely on a natural relation (e.g. that blood trails indicate a wounded prey), human understanding is more sophisticated. The reason for this is that understanding by means of an as-structure involves conventional relations between two particular ‘somethings’ (e.g. that a sharpened stone is seen as a hand axe). Such conventions are determined by human socio-material practices, and, equally important, they point towards particular practical dealings, designs, enskillments *etcetera*.

⁷ Non-analytical philosophers including Ernst Jünger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Giambattista Vico also challenge Cartesian dogmatism.

of the language-game. Is one of its essential features» (Wittgenstein 1969: §3, 2e). This example relates to whether language-users find a statement (e.g. a proposition, a response, an exemplification *etcetera*) to be meaningful. Considering the basic non-representational nature of language, meaning-fulfillment relies on satisfaction which happens to be embedded in the mere 'ongoing' of language-games. On the view presented here, successful (or satisfying) language-games are those that suffices to confirm our beliefs in the world. Plain and simple⁸. Also, as Wittgenstein shows, this aspect is deeply social in the sense that we partake in different language games based on our understanding of what is reasonable, what is true *etcetera*: «The statement “I know that here is a hand” may [...] be continued: “for it’s my hand that I’m looking at”. Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know» (*ivi*: §19, 4e). In order to facilitate socio-cognitive activities, propositions and statements must thus be expressed in accordance with the beliefs of others. On top of this, they are also dependent on the degree of certainty we express. For example, «the statement “I know that behind this door there is a landing and the stairway down to the ground floor” only sounds so convincing because everyone takes it for granted that I know it» (*ivi*: §439, 57e).

Doxastic attitudes such as these characterize language-games that are different from, say, the ones we play as we greet someone by saying “Hello” or when hailing a taxi by shouting “Taxi!”. In being doxastic, an attitude explicates a belief and, as shown by Husserl (1973), entails that something is predicated (e.g. “There is a house behind that hill”, “The apple is red” *etcetera*). Wittgenstein’s examples suggest that there are cases involving satisfaction that links with our explicit reasons and convictions and that, as he rightly reminds us, cause us to «expunge the sentences that don’t get us any further» (*ivi*: §33, 6e). Accordingly, unrealistic and absurd statements are characterized by being idle (in a different sense than Heidegger’s!) meaning that they are practically impotent (cf. *ivi*: §117, 18e). They simply fail to get us anywhere. Thus, we cannot play language-games on the basis of propositions and predications that we find to be wrong or incorrect for the simple reason that they «would not tie with anything» in our lives (*ibidem*). Satisfaction restricts assertive propositions and other kinds of predications in that it determines whether language-users consider them meaningful or not. Consequently, we find statements satisfying – or: meaningful – when they do not actualize an immediate doubt. In the most self-evident statements, it is therefore «difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary» (*ivi*: §93, 14e).

But there is also a foundational kind of belief – and, hence, satisfaction – at play. Proto-doxastic attitudes are more basic for the simple reason that they enable not only our doxastic attitudes but any kind of meaningful linguistic utterance:

Admittedly, if you are obeying the order “Bring me a book”, you may have to check whether the thing you see over there really is a book, but then you do at least know what people mean by “book” ... (*ivi*: §519, 68e).

In being proto-doxastic, these beliefs are so basic that we rarely (if ever!) doubt them. Rather, they form a stable part of our world picture meaning that they simply come to prefigure in what is explicitly posited⁹. Here, satisfaction relates to the confirmation of

⁸ Even a sense of discomfort might be integral to the ongoing of language-games. In the case of bullying, for instance, the victim’s expressions of distress and sadness encourage the bully to continue playing the game.

⁹ Poetry seems to be at odds with such a conformist view on language. Yet, on my view, poetry would not exist if there was not a conformism to subvert in the first place thus it conflicts with Vico’s point that poetry and creativity are the basis of language. My view ties with Ernst Jünger’s (2012) insights on poetic articulation. He argues that the poet «combines words, phrases, tropes *etcetera* which are available to

our implicit (i.e. non-explicated and predicated) beliefs. As the quote suggests, the kind of satisfaction involved might even relate to the language-user's linguistic competencies. Thus, it extends beyond sentences to include words, letters and other linguistic units. Take, for instance, the example from *Philosophical Investigations* where as he utters the word "Slab!", a builder expects his assistant to hand him the thing that he implicitly believes corresponds with the word *slab* (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §2, 6e). Needless to say, the builder's proto-doxastic attitude would be challenged if, for example, the assistant hands him something other than a slab. Put differently, proto-doxastic attitudes not only relate to things in the world but also, even more fundamentally, to our 'knowledge' of linguistic phenomena (i.e. words, sentences, letters *etcetera*). They inform our world picture as they allow us to name things, describe things *etcetera*. This connects with the fact that we use words to refer to something else (i.e. facts, things, other words) thus evoking *as*-structures. Indeed, we have a tacit belief in that a word signifies something. In fact, proto-doxastic attitudes are so basic that they are inherent in all forms of linguistic communication. As the quote above shows, we do so by transcending words and sentences experientially; unless, of course, we engage in metacommunication or we start doubting their meaning. But as Wittgenstein notes, our experience also transcends a myriad of assumptions that need not be linguistic:

If I ask someone "what colour do you see at the moment?" in order, that is, to learn what colour is there at the moment, I cannot at the same time question whether the person I ask understands English, whether he wants to take me in, whether my own memory is not leaving me in the lurch as to the names of colours, and so on (Wittgenstein 1969: §345, 44e).

The importance of satisfaction is underlined by the fact that, given the tacit nature of our belief system, it makes no sense to assume that language-users are able to give, share or receive their individual world pictures with others (as Wittgenstein mentions at one point cf. *ivi*: §262, 34e). From the examples provided above, it seems to follow that our proto-doxastic attitudes are so diverse and manifold that we are only made aware their 'content' once they are being challenged. This links to the fact that, in conversations, we have no grounds for knowing whether our interlocutor has fully understood us. Rather, we simply have to satisfy ourselves with the impression that other people seem to have understood us in that that they permit a language-game to evolve by not expressing doubts. The absence of doubt secures satisfaction and, thus, the continuation or, in Wittgenstein's terms *reoccurrence*, of these games.

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everyone belonging to a particular speech community. As such, language is accessible to us as a repertoire and words may have both tacit and overt meanings». Yet, for Jünger, «it is by combining words that insights emerge in the difference between different meaningful words: "We have countless expressions at our disposal in which a plain meaning coexists with a deeply concealed one, and what is transparency to the eye is here secret consonance" » (Gahrn-Andersen 2017: 72).

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