Unger’s Epistemic Condition for Illocutionary Acts and Hinge Certainty
Abstract
This paper explores Peter Unger’s scepticism, focusing on his analysis of knowledge and his articulation of knowledge as a condition for assertion. The paper pursues two primary objectives: first, to provide a comprehensive and charitable interpretation of Unger’s radical claims, contextualizing them within the initial phase of his work spanning the seventies and early eighties. Second, it aims to shed light on the problematic implications arising from a knowledge condition for assertion, particularly when certainty – as characterized in Unger’s view – is considered necessary for knowledge. The concluding remarks suggest a strategy to avoid these challenges, by proposing an alternative understanding of certainty and knowledge, aligning with recent developments of hinge epistemology.
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