Sul carattere sociale di pensiero e linguaggio

Abstract

According to Donald Davidson, in order to have any propositional attitude, a creature must triangulate objects and events with other creatures sufficiently similar to itself. Hence, social interaction is considered fundamental for thought: a basic kind of triangulation is necessary to fix the empirical content and to have the concept of objectivity, both prerequisites for thought. Conversely, as a pre-cognitive process, triangulation alone is not sufficient; Davidson maintains that another element must be added: it is language. Indeed, Davidson has in mind two kinds of triangulation. First, basic triangulation is considered as a non-intentional, pre-linguistic and pre-cognitive situation where two creatures mutually react to common external stimuli. Second, full-fledged triangulation is supposed to be already propositional, describing an intentional and linguistic situation where two cognitively mature human beings intentionally and consciously react to common external stimuli. In this paper, I have a twofold goal: on the one hand, I shall argue that Davidson’s account, no matter which kind of triangulation should one consider, does not provide any genuine support for the thesis that thought is necessarily social; on the other hand, I shall claim that Davidson’s prerequisites hide some problems that challenge the argument for the sociality of thought