Are Selfless Assertions Hedged?

Grzegorz Gaszczyk

Grzegorz Gaszczyk

Abstract

I argue against Milić’s (2017) proposal of analyzing “selfless assertions” (Lackey 2007) as proper, i.e., as assertions which satisfy the norm of assertion. In his view, selfless assertions are hedged assertions governed by the knowledge norm. In my critique, I show that Milić does not make a case that selfless assertions constitute such a special class of assertions. Moreover, he does not deliver a clear criterion for differentiating between flat-out assertions and hedged ones. What is more, his proposal leaves some cases of selfless assertions unexplained. The outcome is that we are still left without a satisfactory account of selfless assertions as proper assertions.

Riferimenti bibliografici

Carson, Thomas L. (2006), «The definition of lying», in Noûs, vol. 40, n. 2, pp. 284-306.

DeRose, Keith (2002), «Assertion, Knowledge, and Context», in The Philosophical Review, vol. 111, n. 2, pp. 167-203.

Douven, Igor (2006), «Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility», in The Philosophical Review, vol. 115, n. 4, pp. 449-485.

Engel, Pascal (2008), «In what sense is knowledge the norm of assertion?», in Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 77, n. 1, pp. 45-59.

Fallis, Don (2009), «What is lying?», in Journal of Philosophy, vol. 106, n. 1, pp. 29-56.

Gaszczyk, Grzegorz (2019), «A Critique of Turri’s Experimental Research on Selfless Assertions», in Diametros, vol. 16, n. 59, pp. 23-34.

Goldberg, Stanford (2015), Assertion: on the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hawthorne, John (2004), Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kelp, Christoph (2018), «Assertion: A Function First Account», in Noûs, vol. 52, n. 2, pp. 411-442.

Lackey, Jennifer (1999), «Testimonial knowledge and transmission», in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 49, n. 197, pp. 471-490.

Lackey, Jennifer (2007), «Norms of Assertion», in Noûs, vol. 41, n. 4, pp. 594-626.

Lackey, Jennifer (2013), «Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce», in Analysis, vol. 73, n. 2, pp. 236-248.

MacFarlane, John (2011), What Is Assertion?, in Brown, Jessica & Cappelen, Herman (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

McKinnon, Rachel (2013), «The supportive reasons norm of assertion», in American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 50, n. 2, pp. 121-135.

McKinnon, Rachel (2015), The norms of assertion: Truth, lies, and warrant, Palgrave MacMillan , London.

Milić, Ivan (2017), «Against selfless assertions», in Philosophical Studies, vol. 174, n. 9, pp. 2277-2295.

Montminy, Martin (2013), The Single Norm of Assertion in Capone, Alessandro, Lo Piparo, Franco & Carapezza, Marco (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, Springer.

Pelling Charlie (2013a), «Assertion and safety», in Synthese, vol. 190, n. 17, pp. 3777-3796.

Pelling Charlie (2013b), «Assertion and the provision of knowledge», in The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 63, n. 251, pp. 293-312.

Pritchard Duncan (2014), Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion, in Littlejohn, Clayton & Turri, John (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Sorensen, Roy (2007), «Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive», in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 88, n. 2, pp. 251-264.

Stanley, Jason (2008), «Knowledge and certainty», in Philosophical Issues, vol. 18, n. 1, pp. 35-57.

Stokke, Andreas (2018), Lying and Insincerity, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Turri, John (2014), You Gotta Believe, in Littlejohn, Clayton & Turri, John (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Turri, John (2015), «Selfless assertions: Some empirical evidence», in Synthese, vol. 192, n. 4, pp. 1221-1233.

Weiner, Matthew (2005), «Must we Know what we Say?», in The Philosophical Review, vol. 114, n. 2, 227-251.

Williamson, Timothy (1996), «Knowing and Asserting», in The Philosophical Review, vol. 105, n. 4, pp. 489-523.